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Abstract 
With the Eastern Enlargement successfully completed, the EU is searching for a proper 
balance between internal security and external stabilisation that is acceptable to all sides. 
This paper focuses on an EU foreign policy instrument that is a case in point for this struggle: 
EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements. By looking at the EU's strategy on visa 
facilitation and readmission, this paper aims to offer a first systematic analysis of the 
objectives, substance and political implications of these agreements. The analysis considers 
the instrument of EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements as a means to implement a 
new EU security approach in the neighbourhood. In offering more relaxed travel conditions in 
exchange for the signing of an EC readmission agreement and reforming domestic justice and 
home affairs, the EU has found a new way to press for reforms in neighbouring countries 
while addressing a major source of discontent in these countries. The analysis concludes with 
the broader implications of these agreements and argues that even if the facilitated travel 
opportunities are beneficial for the citizens of the target countries, the positive achievements 
are undermined by the Schengen enlargement, which makes the new member states tie up 
their borders to those of their neighbours. 
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EC VISA FACILITATION AND READMISSION 
AGREEMENTS:  
IMPLEMENTING A NEW EU SECURITY APPROACH 
IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD 
FLORIAN TRAUNER & IMKE KRUSE
* 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the EU has assumed a greater role in dealing with security concerns within the 
EU. In response to nation states’ decreasing capabilities to deal effectively with problems at the 
national level, domestic policy fields such as asylum and migration have been at least partially 
transferred to supranational responsibility (Scharpf, 2003; Zürn, 2000). One of the issues that 
receives increasing attention at the supranational level is irregular migration. Every year, an 
estimated 30 million people cross an international border irregularly, of which, according to 
Europol, between 400,000 and 500,000 enter the EU. The stock of irregular residents in the EU 
is currently estimated to be around three million (Council of Europe, 2003). In recent years, EU 
members have come to the conclusion that they are no longer able to properly react to the 
phenomenon of irregular migration on the domestic level and instead need to combine their 
efforts regarding return policies on the European level. Measures against irregular immigration 
thus became a focal point in the EU’s efforts to establish an ‘area of freedom, security and 
justice’.  
At the same time, the EU’s role in the outside world has changed. With the Eastern 
enlargement, new regions and countries became neighbours of the EU. New frameworks of 
cooperation, such as the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) were set in motion to closely affiliate neighbouring states with the 
EU (Emerson, 2005; Emerson & Noutcheva, 2005; Emerson et al., 2007; Landaburu, 2006; 
Tassinari, 2006). The EU tried to assume a greater responsibility in the stabilisation of the 
neighbourhood and sought to “promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the 
European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and 
cooperative relations” (European Security Strategy, 2003, p. 8). A major challenge in the EU’s 
efforts to stabilise the neighbourhood was to find a proper balance with the internal security 
concerns. Whereas the EU’s foreign and security policy was interested in advancing regional 
integration and good neighbourly relations, the EU justice and home affairs ministers were 
primarily guided by their interest in keeping problems out and the external border closed.  
This paper is concerned with an EU foreign policy instrument that is a case in point for this 
struggle: EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements. These agreements aim at fostering 
good neighbourly relations by easing the tight visa regime with neighbouring countries in order 
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to externalise a restrictive migration policy. By elaborating on the EU’s strategy on visa 
facilitation and readmission, this paper aims at offering a first systematic analysis of the 
objective, substance, and political implications of these agreements. When was the link between 
visa facilitation and readmission made? What are the target countries, and what do these 
agreements imply for these countries?  
In the following, we start with an elaboration of the problems inherent in the EU’s efforts to 
establish a strong external border control while seeking to stabilise the neighbourhood. The 
argument this paper advances is that the shifting of the EU’s border policies to the Central and 
Eastern European countries has created a need for a new EU security approach in the 
neighbourhood. This approach is defined as the explicit attempt of the EU to balance internal 
security concerns and external stabilisation needs. In offering more relaxed travel conditions in 
exchange for the signing of an EC readmission agreement and reforming domestic justice and 
home affairs, the EU found a new way to press for reforms in neighbouring countries, while 
meeting a major source of discontent in these countries. Part 3 introduces the instrument of an 
EC readmission agreement, looks back over when the connection to visa facilitation was made 
and presents the importance of EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements in the relations 
with the Western Balkan countries on the one hand, and the European Neighbourhood Policy on 
the other. Since the Western Balkan countries have the prospect of joining the EU one day, they 
are not subsumed under the European Neighbourhood Policy but under a specific regional pre-
accession strategy. Part 4 analyses the differences and similarities between the various visa and 
readmission agreements. EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements were so far concluded 
with the Western Balkan countries, Ukraine, Moldova and the Russian Federation and may 
become a standard foreign policy instrument in the context of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. The analysis concludes with the broader implications of these agreements and argues 
that even if facilitated travel opportunities are beneficial for the citizens of the target countries, 
the positive achievements are undermined by the Schengen enlargement, which makes the new 
member states tie up their borders to those of their neighbours.  
2.  Controlling EU frontiers while stabilising the neighbourhood: 
conflicting objectives? 
Since the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU has worked on the establishment of a common “area of 
freedom, security and justice”. Political actors have developed a common understanding of 
security threats based on the idea that a safe inside should be most effectively protected from an 
unsafe outside (Monar, 2001a). Accordingly, a strong and effective control of external frontiers 
became a crucial objective of EU cooperation in justice and home affairs. At the same time, 
with the Central and Eastern European countries becoming new EU member states, the 
stabilisation of the neighbourhood gained in importance. With a particular focus on the role of 
visa and readmission policies, the following section discusses the problems arising from the 
EU’s efforts to establish a strong and effective external border control while seeking to stabilise 
the neighbourhood.  
2.1  The birth of the European area of freedom, security and justice 
The Treaty of Amsterdam first introduced the idea of establishing a “European area of freedom, 
security and justice”: barriers to the free movement of people across borders should be 
minimised, the EU’s internal security enhanced, and the human rights of all EU citizens 
respected. On the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU’s cooperation in justice and home 
affairs took on an entirely new quality and developed a substantial growth dynamic. The domain 
turned into a major field of EU policy making. EU action in justice and home affairs was no EC VISA FACILITATION AND READMISSION AGREEMENTS | 3 
 
longer seen as complementary to the functioning of the single European market, but rather as a 
means to realise the ambitious project of an area of freedom, security and justice. The EU was 
to create an “internal security regime” (Anderson & Apap, 2002, p. 4) consisting of three main 
pillars:  
1)  the creation of a common territory without internal borders along with the setting-up of a 
common external border policy;  
2)  the strengthening of international police cooperation, particularly in (internal) cross-border 
regions (regulations of cross-border pursuit, joint police stations, joint patrolling in cross-
border areas, etc.);  
3)  and finally, the pooling of police data and information among national law enforcement 
bodies (Schengen Information System – SIS; Costumes Information Service – CIS, 
Europol’s computerised system of collected information, Eurodac) (Anderson & Apap, 
2002, p. 4; Apap et al., 2004, p. 9).  
But what were the dynamics underlying the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice?  
In his widely cited article ‘The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving 
Factors and Costs’, Jörg Monar (2001a) explained the rapid development and expansion of co-
operation in justice and home affairs on the basis of two sets of factors; firstly: “‘laboratories’ 
which have helped to pave the way for the extraordinary development during the last decade 
and [secondly] ‘driving factors’ which have been triggering developments and further expansion 
of EU action” (Monar, 2001a, p. 748). The Council of Europe, Trevi and Schengen were 
identified as the major laboratories.
1 Transnational challenges, spillover-effects from economic 
integration, the interest of certain member states to ‘Europeanise’ their national problems and 
the dynamic created by the launching of the project of an ‘area of freedom, security’ were listed 
as the major driving forces.  
Other scholars argued that the dynamic growth cannot be understood without focusing on the 
changing conceptions of security and its implications for EU cooperation in justice and home 
affairs (Anderson & Apap, 2002; Bigo & Guild, 2005a; Huysmans, 2000). Since the 1980s co-
operation in various security issues has led to close interaction between national interior 
ministers and their officials. These political actors promoted their action in very different policy 
areas, such as terrorism, organised crime, trans-border crime, irregular immigration, asylum 
seekers and minority ethnic groups, as different elements to deal with one general security 
threat. As a matter of fact, different groups of people and problems were categorised “too 
quickly and too emphatically” (Anderson & Apap, 2002, p. 1) as security threats. This 
categorisation of various phenomena as security threats concerned first and foremost migrants 
and asylum seekers. Migration was increasingly described as a danger to domestic security, 
representing a threat. In this way, migration has been converted into a law-and-order question 
and became “securitized” (Huysmans, 2000; Vink, 2002).  
However, not all migrants were categorised as a threat: migrants from within Europe, more 
specifically from within the EU, were excluded from the political discourse. While the free 
movement of persons within the EU was actually fostered, the discursive logic drew a clear 
distinction between EU-nationals and non-EU-nationals. The EU-space was presented as the 
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“safe(r) inside” and contrasted with the “unsafe(r) outside” (Monar, 2001a, p. 762). The EU’s 
frontiers were increasingly established as the dividing line between inside and outside, and “law 
enforcement and border controls [became] key instruments to maintain and further enhance the 
distinction” (Ibid). The control of the external frontiers became the one major objective of EU 
cooperation in justice and home affairs. These discursive narratives of the relation between 
frontier and controls are now widely accepted in the EU but have also met strong criticism in 
that they artificially construct “frontiers” and create the myth that the effective control of these 
frontiers would be the solution of “immigration control” (Bigo, 2005).  
2.2  Extending the EU’s border control policies to the East: implications for 
inside and outside countries  
In the Amsterdam Treaty the EU15 took a major decision with regard to justice and home 
affairs and the EU’s external relations. Due to security concerns in the Central and Eastern 
European countries, the EU15 decided to include the Schengen regulations and rules – “an 
uncatalogued miscellany of decisions and agreed working practices, a sort of disjointed 
incrementalism par excellence” (Lavenex & Wallace, 2005, p. 465) – into the EU’s acquis 
communautaire to be incorporated in the legal order of the countries seeking accession. Article 
8 of the Schengen Protocol annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty states that the “[S]chengen acquis 
and further measures taken by the institutions within its scope […] must be accepted in full by 
all States candidates for admission.” Opt-outs like those of the UK and Ireland were no longer 
permissible for new member states. This decision was based on the dual motivation  
to bring the applicant border policies progressively in line with the Schengen acquis 
and also to address immediate EU concerns about threats perceived by its member 
states. The most evident and pervasive of these concerns is the potential for illegal 
immigration by east Europeans or third-country nationals travelling through the 
applicant countries (Grabbe, 2000, p. 9). 
The definition of the Schengen regulations as part of the acquis meant for the candidate states in 
Central and Eastern Europe that a sizeable and complex body of laws and practice must be 
implemented upon accession. The candidate states found themselves under strong pressure to 
upgrade their external border control regimes to the high legal, organisational and technical 
standards outlined in the Schengen acquis. The adaptation process involved substantial financial 
and administrative efforts (House of Lords, 2000; Monar, 2001b).  
What is more, the new drawing of the EU’s external border had a profound impact on the 
relations between the enlarged EU and the non-EU parts of Europe. Fears were voiced that the 
transfer of rigid border control policies would reinforce barriers between countries that 
traditionally had close relations, such as Poland and Ukraine. A particular concern was the 
transfer of the EU’s visa regime to the accession countries. The candidate countries needed to 
adopt the EU’s visa regime in full and were therefore required to impose visas on citizens of 
neighbouring countries in case those states were listed on the EU’s negative visa list. This 
conditionality requirement was particularly difficult as many applicant states had minorities on 
the other side of the border (for instance, the Hungarian minority in Serbia). Moreover, after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the governments of the Central European states had pursued an open 
borders policy as an important element to maintain good relationships with neighbouring 
countries. Sustained by Western European states as part of regional and bilateral integration, 
these countries have built up intense relations across borders and allowed citizens of countries 
such as Russia, Ukraine or Belarus to travel easily to Central and Eastern Europe.  
The open-borders policy has affected thousands of ordinary citizens on both sides of 
the border, and has significantly contributed to efforts to overcome the historical legacy EC VISA FACILITATION AND READMISSION AGREEMENTS | 5 
 
of mutual prejudice, stereotypes and resentments. […] Open borders have also fostered 
contacts of national minorities, such as the Belarusians in Poland or the Hungarians in 
Ukraine (Trans-Carpatia), Yugoslavia (Vojvodina) and Romania, with their mother 
countries (Apap et al., 2001, pp. 2-3).  
The EU enlargement process led to the end of the liberalised movement of persons in the region. 
The accession process made the Central and Eastern European countries demand new visa 
requirements for third countries being located on the EU’s negative visa list, including all 
Western Balkan states (with the exception of Croatia), Russia, Ukraine and other CIS countries. 
This step seriously confined the possibilities of free movement for citizens of these states. The 
imposition of visa requirements was therefore likely to disrupt the socioeconomic and political 
relationships across border regions (see, inter alia, Grabbe, 2002, p. 91f; Monar, 2001b, p. 9f; 
Apap et al., 2001). Scholars observed an inherent tension between the EU’s internal and 
external security policies in Central and Eastern Europe:  
The EU’s external security concerns have caused it to encourage regional integration at 
all levels in eastern Europe, but at the same time its emerging internal security policies 
(contained in the newly integrated Schengen Convention, and justice and home affairs 
cooperation) are having contrary effects by reinforcing barriers between countries 
(Grabbe, 2000, p. 1).  
In this view, the EU was not paying enough attention to the geo-political implications of 
enlargement.  
The EU tried to minimise the negative side-effects of enlargement. In the European Security 
Strategy, the neighbouring countries moved to the centre of attention.  
It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We 
need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in 
the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and 
more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due 
course also be a neighbouring region (European Security Strategy, 2003, p. 9).  
In March 2003, a new framework of relations was proposed with the countries neighbouring the 
enlarged Union to the East and South. The objective was to “develop a zone of prosperity and a 
friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-
operative relations” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, p. 4). On the one hand, 
the initiative was intended to associate the neighbouring states as closely as possible, on the 
other hand it made clear that full membership is not an option. The former President of the 
European Commission Romano Prodi phrased this principle as “sharing everything but 
institutions” (Prodi, 2002). The initiative is therefore the attempt to stabilise the European 
neighbourhood without the most successful foreign policy tool, i.e. the membership incentive 
(as a result, the Western Balkans and Turkey were excluded from the European Neighbourhood 
Policy as they still have the membership perspective). This time, the major incentive for 
cooperation should be the vision of an open and integrated market: 
Russia, the countries of the Western NIS and the Southern Mediterranean should be 
offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and 
liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital 
(four freedoms) (Commission of the European Communities, 2003a, p. 4).  
In brief, the European Neighbourhood Policy presents a major political project of the EU “with 
the aim to manage its new interdependence in an altered geopolitical context” (Lavenex, 2004, 
p. 680). This new interdependence concerns in particular “soft security” issues to be dealt with 
in justice and home affairs cooperation (for more details, see Wichmann, 2007). In this respect, 6 | TRAUNER & KRUSE 
 
the policies on visa and readmission were considered as particularly important elements – 
although for different reasons.  
2.3  The relevance of visa and readmission policies in the neighbourhood 
The EU considers its visa policies a chief means to select ‘worthy’ from ‘unworthy’ guests. 
Issuing visas occupies an important place in the EU’s understanding of effective and 
comprehensive border management. For the EU, the first line of border control starts directly in 
third-countries, whereas the second line is the border itself. Visas therefore play an important 
role in what scholars called “policing at a distance” (Bigo & Guild, 2005b, p. 1). The 
Amsterdam Treaty transferred far-reaching competences in the visa domain to the European 
Community, which were then used to differentiate the world in four categories of citizens:
2 
firstly, European Union citizens who have the right to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the European Union (limitations to this right are allowed only in a few cases); 
secondly, citizens of countries participating in the European Economic Area enjoying privileged 
relationships with the EU and having equivalent rights; thirdly, favoured third-countries, e.g. 
Israel, which are placed on the EU’s ‘positive’ visa list of Council Regulation 539/2001 
meaning that their nationals do not require a visa to enter the EU; and finally, third-countries 
that are placed on the ‘negative’ visa list of Council Regulation 539/2001 meaning that their 
citizens do require a visa to enter the EU (Bigo & Guild, 2005c, pp. 235-236; Council of the 
European Union, 2001a).  
Citizens of countries placed on the negative visa list are considered by definition as potential 
security risks. Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild point to the fact that the negative visa list, “if one 
applies the logic to its extreme, [is] a generalized form of the so-called ‘rogue states’. It denotes 
suspicion, mistrust and fear about the nationals of that state” (Bigo & Guild, 2005c, p. 236). In 
Council Decision 539/2001, the EU has placed all countries subsumed under the current 
enlargement process and the European Neighbourhood Policy onto the list of countries whose 
citizens require a visa for the EU. The two exceptions were Israel and Croatia.  
This decision was bound to have major implications. In the neighbouring countries being placed 
on the negative visa list, the picture was reinforced that the EU is establishing a ‘fortress 
Europe’. The visa policies have negatively affected the image of the European Union in the 
neighbourhood. Obtaining a Schengen Visa is a relatively complicated and costly procedure for 
third-country citizens. Studies revealed that the current EU visa practices are perceived as 
intransparent, too expensive and troublesome in neighbouring countries (ICG, 2005; Boratynski 
et al., 2006a). Even the European Commission noticed that “our existing visa policies and 
practices often impose real difficulties and obstacles to legitimate travel. Long queues in front 
of EU consulates are a highly visible sign of the barriers to entry into the Union” (Commission 
of the European Communities, 2006a, p. 5). Due to its geographical location, the negative 
implications of the visa regime were particularly visible in the Western Balkans. In this regional 
setting, the EU’s visa regime has even caused an increasing European alienation effect. The 
                                                      
2 First aspects of the visa policies were already brought within the Community framework with the 
Maastricht Treaty, concretely, the determination of the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the member states, and the establishment of a 
standard model visa. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) then broke ground for an expansion of the EU’s visa 
policy. It was pooled in the newly introduced Title IV ‘Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other Policies 
related to free movements of persons’ and brought under the legal framework of the Community. In 
addition, the Schengen acquis was annexed to the treaty, so that harmonisation measures regarding visas 
upon which the Schengen members have agreed outside the Community now became part of the Union’s 
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International Crisis Groups assessed that the current visa regime was seen as “fostering 
resentment, inhibiting progress on trade, business, education and more open civil societies, and 
as a result contributing negatively to regional stability” (ICG, 2005, p. i). 
In interviews for this analysis, European Commission officials also named a second reason why 
the current EU visa practices were increasingly put into question: they simply do not achieve the 
desired results. In the EU a consensus is emerging that irregular immigration and organised 
crime cannot be prevented through strict visa regulations. See, for instance, the statement of a 
European Commission official who critically assessed the current visa practices:  
There is a big misunderstanding in the EU. Visa policy has nothing to do with illegal 
migration or trafficking in human beings. It is like the link between prohibition and 
drinking beer. Once you forbid alcohol at all levels, all beer drinkers become criminals. 
If you are limiting or suppressing the possibilities for something that is basic, like beer 
drinking or going to Paris for a weekend, then people invent things to be nonetheless 
able to do it. And they will find a way. So the EU’s visa policy is not helping a bit to 
reduce the number of criminals or economic illegal immigrants, because they are 
already there.
3  
For the EU, another instrument gained in importance that was considered more effective in 
terms of reducing irregular immigration: the signing of readmission agreements. An effective 
return policy to enforce control measures moved to the centre of member states’ attention when 
the Schengen agreements shifted the focus from nation state borders to external borders. The 
European Commission, as well as governments of member states, argued on various occasions 
that the credibility and integrity of the legal EU immigration system would be in danger without 
an efficient common return policy (Commission of the European Communities, 2003b, p. 8). 
Consequently, readmission agreements – a long-standing instrument of nation states to facilitate 
the return of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers – have increasingly been discussed 
as a Community instrument on the supranational level. After the Amsterdam Treaty had 
transferred the competence to negotiate and conclude readmission agreements with third 
countries to the European Union, the European Council had to adopt criteria for identifying 
third countries with which multilateral readmission agreements should be negotiated (Council of 
the European Union, 2002a). The following criteria were agreed: 
•  Nature and size of migratory flows toward the EU (migration pressure, number of persons 
awaiting return); 
•  Geographical position vis-à-vis the EU and regional balance; 
•  Need for capacity-building concerning migration management; 
•  Existing framework for cooperation; 
•  Attitude towards cooperation on migration issues (Council of the European Union, 2002a, 
Council of the European Union, 2002c). 
The EU’s activism with regard to signing EC readmission agreements with neighbouring 
countries showed that the EU increasingly became aware of the insufficiency of domestic 
border controls if those are not backed up by cooperation with countries of origin and transit; 
this underscored the external dimension of JHA policies. We can generally distinguish two 
approaches to dealing with the external dimension of EU migration policy: the first approach 
seeks to externalise traditional tools of domestic or EU migration control to sending and transit 
countries, e.g. border control. The second approach is preventive in nature and strives towards 
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eliminating the root causes of migration (Boswell, 2003). These two approaches differ 
fundamentally in their perception of how to deal with substantial numbers of immigrants and 
most likely affect the EU’s relations with neighbouring countries in different ways. The first is a 
restrictive and control-oriented approach in which the EU passes classic migration control 
instruments on to non-member countries that have to accept provisions for facilitating the return 
of irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers. The second approach seeks to abolish 
circumstances in the countries of origin that force people to migrate to the EU and builds on 
mutually beneficial forms of cooperation between the EU and third countries. 
The European Union has repeatedly emphasised that it seeks to take both approaches into 
account. However, the more restrictive first approach – for which readmission agreements are a 
case in point – has dominated the debate at least since the beginning of the millennium. The 
framing of readmission policy has been of high significance for the EU’s attitude towards 
countries of origin and transit. The top priority position that was increasingly given to the 
negotiations on EC readmission agreements with third countries illustrated the focus on 
restrictive policies of demarcation. When the EU realised the limited success in signing 
readmission agreements and accepted the link between readmission and visa facilitation, the 
restrictive approach was softened at least with regard to the neighbouring regions.  
3.  EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements: developing a new 
security approach 
This section introduces the eventual coupling of the negotiations on EC readmission agreements 
to the incentive of visa facilitation. The instrument of EC visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements was considered to be beneficial to both sides: they provide the EU with a strong 
lever to make third countries sign readmission agreements and increase the reform efforts in 
their domestic justice and home affairs sector, while they also meet major grievances of the 
neighbouring countries by easing the tight visa regime and fostering facilitated travel 
opportunities for bona fide travellers. EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements gradually 
moved to the centre of a new EU security approach in the neighbourhood.  
3.1  The instrument of EC readmission agreements with neighbouring states  
3.1.1 What are EC readmission agreements?  
The EU’s efforts to reach a high number of readmission agreements with all states around its 
territory, and even with more distant transit and origin countries, represents the attempt to create 
concentric circles of demarcation (Council of the European Union, 1998, Article 60). The 
concept of concentric circles of demarcation stands for extending the redistributive system for 
the examination of asylum claims to non-EU countries and expulsing irregular immigration to 
outside territories. Such a policy is intended to transfer responsibility to non-member countries. 
Whereas the original model included four circles (Council of the European Union, 1998, point 
61), in the context of EC readmission agreements, the model of concentric circles was slightly 
modified to three circles of enforcement: the pre-embarkation checks are geographically the 
outermost circle and the Schengen border is the innermost. The network of readmission 
agreements then constitutes the middle circle. 
After the Amsterdam Treaty transferred competences for readmission to the EU, member states 
decided to sign only those Community readmission agreements that provide for the return of not 
only citizens of contracting states but also third country nationals. Such an obligation to readmit EC VISA FACILITATION AND READMISSION AGREEMENTS | 9 
 
third country nationals cannot be deduced from international law.
4 However, some advocates of 
readmission of foreign nationals refer to “the principle of neighbourliness and the responsibility 
of a state for those impairments to other states emanating from its territory” (Hailbronner, 1997, 
p. 31). They argue that the ideas of good neighbourhood and European solidarity imply that 
each state bears the responsibility for aliens who have transited its territory on their way to a 
neighbouring state.  
What is basically missing in order to integrate the obligation to readmit third country nationals 
into customary international law is consistent state practice – and this is what EU member states 
are keen to see. By establishing a trend towards such an obligation and by including precise 
descriptions of material and procedural demands on transit countries into readmission 
agreements, the EU is seeking to transform international law. When a new norm is widely 
accepted, it will be integrated into customary international law.  
Community readmission agreements are being signed on the basis of the principle of 
reciprocity, which means that all contracting states must be prepared to readmit not only their 
own citizens but even third country nationals on the same terms. However, in the case of 
readmission agreements between the EU on the one hand and non-EU member states on the 
other, the argument of reciprocity is hypocritical because those countries with which it is of 
interest for the EU to conclude agreements would not have any problems with expulsions to the 
EU.
5 
When EU actors increasingly became aware of the problems in negotiating readmission 
agreements with transit countries and of the problematic consequences that readmission 
agreements entail for them, EU documents began to frequently refer to the responsibility of each 
nation state to control its borders efficiently in order to justify its policy: “The objective of 
readmission is to make the Member States and third States take responsibility for the failings of 
their border control systems” (Council of the European Union, 2001b, p. 9).
6 It has also been 
said that readmission agreements function as stimuli for more stringent border controls in the 
transit country.  
3.1.2 Actors in readmission 
By its very nature, readmission concerns three actors: the state that requests readmission, the 
state that is requested to readmit, and the person to be readmitted (either irregular migrant or 
rejected asylum seeker). Their interests are very different. While the first two actors decide upon 
the legal framework of readmission, the third one is its mere object. The returning state usually 
refers to the integrity of its asylum system or its migration control system and argues that the 
electorate is in favour of a restrictive control approach. Even though forced return is costly, the 
expense is considered to be lower than the long-term financial costs of not implementing it. The 
state requested to readmit may have economic, demographic or social interests in not 
readmitting its own citizens and even more so third country nationals.  
The person to be readmitted is confronted with the choice between staying in irregularity or 
returning. If the individual is unwilling to return, the returning state might react by threatening 
                                                      
4 Council of the European Union (1999a) and Hailbronner (1997).  
5 The Council had already pointed to this kind of asymmetrical reciprocity much earlier (Council of the 
European Union, 1999b). 
6 In a later version, the wording was slightly changed in a more positive way: “Readmission makes the 
Member States and the third States responsible for controlling their borders efficiently” (Council of the 
European Union, 2002d).  10 | TRAUNER & KRUSE 
 
and then also implementing forced removal.
7 Furthermore, the authorities of the country of 
origin or transit might display an uncooperative attitude by denying that the individual actually 
possesses their nationality, by not issuing the necessary travel documents, or by objecting to the 
modalities of return.  
Readmission questions constitute a segment of those policy issues that, when the Treaty of 
Amsterdam took effect, became part of the acquis in the 1st pillar. The competence to conclude 
readmission agreements on behalf of EU member states was shifted to the European 
Community. The European Commission received the mandate by member states to negotiate 
readmission agreements with non-member countries on their behalf. However, not all of the EU 
members participate in readmission policy. Since Community readmission agreements are based 
upon the provision of Title IV of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), they 
are not applicable to the UK and Ireland unless these countries opt-in in the manner provided for 
by the Protocol to the TEC.
8 Likewise Community readmission agreements will not extend to 
Denmark by virtue of the Protocol on the position of Denmark.
9 
In September 2000, the Commission received the first mandates for negotiations with Morocco, 
Sri Lanka, Russia, and Pakistan; in May 2001 with Hong Kong and Macao; in June 2002 with 
Ukraine; and in November 2002 with Albania, Algeria, Turkey, and China (Council of the 
European Union, 2002a). The very detailed mandate was prepared by the Expulsion Working 
Party, rests upon a draft model readmission agreement, and does not leave much flexibility to 
the Commission.  
3.2  Change of mandate in the course of negotiations on EC readmission: 
including visa facilitation 
In 2002, member states started to call for the speeding-up of ongoing readmission negotiations – 
a claim, which has been ever since reiterated at every opportunity.
10 At the end of the year, the 
Commission conceded that negotiations on readmission agreements had not led to quick 
results.
11 In the following months, the Commission repeatedly asked the Council to think about 
                                                      
7 On the more detailed legal implications of a state’s right to expel individuals, see Noll (1999). 
8 Where one or both of the governments wants to take part in an initiative related to Title IV TEC, they 
may notify the president of the Council within three months. If a measure concerning Title IV TEC has 
been adopted by the Council and Britain and Ireland have not decided to opt-in, both countries can decide 
at any later time to accept that measure. With regard to Community readmission agreements, both 
countries generally tend to participate, but the decision is made on a case-by-case basis. The UK has 
decided to opt-in to all readmission agreements signed so far. In contrast, the Irish government voted 
against opting-in to the agreements with Albania and Macao. 
9 Article 1 of this protocol constitutes the Danish opt-out from all measures pursuant to Title IV TEC, and 
the provisions under Article 2 are the same as those used in the British and Irish cases. In contrast to the 
UK and Ireland, however, Denmark lacks the possibility of voluntary opt-in. The only exception is 
initiatives build upon the Schengen acquis under Title IV TEC. Here, Denmark can decide to opt-in 
within six months. But since readmission agreements have been handled as an external matter rather than 
being Schengen-related Denmark has no possibility to opt-in. As a result, some Community readmission 
agreements entail a joint declaration on Denmark in which the country expresses its desire to conclude a 
bilateral readmission agreement with the country at hand in the same terms as the Community agreement. 
Similarly, these Community readmission agreements include a joint declaration on the intention of 
Iceland and Norway to sign bilateral readmission agreements with the respective third countries because 
these countries participate in the Schengen agreements. 
10 Commission of the European Communities (2002b). 
11 Ibid. See also Commission of the European Communities (2003b). EC VISA FACILITATION AND READMISSION AGREEMENTS | 11 
 
incentives, e.g. more generous visa policies, or increased quotas for migrant workers, that might 
help to obtain the cooperation of third countries in the negotiation and conclusion of 
readmission agreements. In that, the Commission implicitly addressed criticism from various 
governments of member states, which had complained repeatedly about too little progress in 
negotiations and had sought to put pressure on the Commission to come up with more results. 
Alongside the difficulties in readmission negotiations, at least standard readmission clauses had 
been approved in 1999 as mandatory elements for inclusion in all future association and 
cooperation agreements by the EC.  
Ongoing difficulties in negotiating readmission agreements forced the governments of EU 
member states to consider how to expand the Commission’s margin during negotiations. 
Gradually it became clear that concessions had to be made and more attractive packages would 
have to be linked to the policy field of migration. In the months that followed, visa facilitation 
became the major compensation matter introduced by third countries in negotiations with the 
EU. Besides the very special cases of Hong Kong and Macao, the most successful link between 
readmission and visas has been made by the Russian Federation. In July 2004, the Council 
authorised the Commission to negotiate not only on readmission but even on visa facilitation 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2004, p. 12). Shortly afterwards, the link between 
readmission and visa facilitation became official for Ukraine, too. Even China officially asked 
the Community, in May 2004, to negotiate on visa facilitation in parallel with negotiations on 
readmission.
12 In the multi-annual programme on strengthening freedom, security, and justice 
(the so-called Hague Programme), member states finally referred to the Commission’s call and 
agreed to further examine a possible link between readmission and visa facilitation: 
The European Council (…) invites the Council and the Commission to examine, with a 
view to developing a common approach, whether in the context of the EC readmission 
policy it would be opportune to facilitate, on a case by case basis, the issuance of short-
stay visas to third-country nationals, where possible and on a basis of reciprocity, as 
part of a real partnership in external relations, including migration-related issues 
(Council of the European Union, 2004, p. 18).  
As Table 1 shows, by the time the negotiations with the Western Balkan countries started in 
2006, the link between readmission and visa facilitation had become acceptable for EU member 
states so that negotiations were combined from the very beginning.  
Table 1. EC Visa Facilitation (VF) and Readmission Agreements (RA): State of Negotiations  
Country  Type of 
Agreement 
Negotiation 
Mandate 
Start of 
Negotiations 
End of 
Negotiations 
Entering 
into Force 
Albania  RA  Nov 2002  March 2003  April 2005  May 2006 
  VF  Nov 2006  Nov 2006  Nov 2007  Jan 2008 
Bosnia   RA  Nov 2006  Nov 2006  Nov 2007  Jan 2008 
  VF  Nov 2006  Nov 2006  Nov 2007  Jan 2008 
Hong Kong  RA  May 2001  June 2001  Nov 2002  March 2004 
 VF*  --  --  --  -- 
Macao RA  May  2001  July  2001 Oct  2003 June  2004 
 VF*  --  --  --  -- 
                                                      
12 With regard to China, an important agreement, the Destination Status Agreement, had already taken a 
first step towards visa facilitation in February 2004. It incorporated a readmission clause as a ‘quid pro 
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Macedonia RA  Nov  2006  Nov  2006  Nov 2007  Jan 2008 
  VF  Nov 2006  Nov 2006  Nov 2007  Jan 2008 
Moldova  RA  Dec 2006  Feb 2007  Nov 2007  Jan 2008 
  VF  Dec 2006  Feb 2007  Nov 2007  Jan 2008 
Montenegro  RA  Nov 2006  Nov 2006  Nov 2007  Jan 2008 
  VF  Nov 2006  Nov 2006  Nov 2007  Jan 2008 
Russia  RA  Sept 2000  April 2001  May 2006  June 2007° 
  VF  July 2004  June 2005  May 2006  June 2007 
Serbia  RA  Nov 2006  Nov 2006  Nov 2007  Jan 2008 
  VF  Nov 2006  Nov 2006  Nov 2007  Jan 2008 
Sri Lanka  RA  Sept 2000  April 2001  Feb 2002  May 2005 
 VF  --  --  --  -- 
Ukraine  RA  Feb 2002  August 2002  Oct 2006  Jan 2008^ 
  VF  Nov 2005  Nov 2005  Oct 2006  Jan 2008 
Ongoing Negotiations       
Algeria  RA  Nov 2002  June 2005     
 VF       
China RA  Nov  2002  April  2004     
 VF       
Morocco  RA  Sept 2000  May 2001     
 VF       
Pakistan RA  Sept  2000  April  2001     
 VF       
Turkey RA  Nov  2002  March  2003     
 VF       
* Hong Kong and Macao were exempted from visa requirements in December 2000 
° The provisions on the readmission of third country nationals and stateless people will only become 
applicable after a transitional period of 3 years. 
^ The provisions on the readmission of third country nationals and stateless people will only become 
applicable after a transitional period of 2 years. 
3.3  The test case: visa facilitation and readmission agreements with the 
Western Balkans  
The Western Balkan states have particularly close relations with the EU. After the Kosovo war 
in 1999, the EU launched the Stabilisation and Association Process and granted the non-
member states of South Eastern Europe the status of “potential candidates for EU membership” 
(European Council, 2000). The EU’s pre-accession strategy was modelled on the experiences of 
the Eastern Enlargement although containing some distinctive features, such as the unusually 
broad range of political and economic conditions (for more details, see Noutcheva, 2007; 
Trauner, 2007). The EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements to be signed with the 
Western Balkans were intended to intensify the cooperation on reducing irregular immigration, 
and, at the same time, bringing relaxation to the tight visa regime the EU had imposed on these 
countries. Through this, the agreements should be beneficial to both sides. Whereas the EU had EC VISA FACILITATION AND READMISSION AGREEMENTS | 13 
 
a better means to deal with irregular migration transiting or stemming from the Balkans, the 
countries would come closer to a visa-free regime – an objective they were persistently lobbying 
for. Of the aspiring candidates in the Western Balkans, only Croatia is visa-free (Council of the 
European Union, 2001a).  
Since the Western Balkan states were placed on the EU’s negative visa list in 2001, they were 
hoping for a quick visa liberalisation scheme. However, the EU recognised a free-visa regime as 
a long term objective only. The 2003 Thessaloniki Agenda first introduced the prospect of a 
liberalised visa regime, once certain conditions have been met:  
The EU is aware of the importance the peoples and governments in the Western 
Balkans attach to the perspective of liberalisation of the visa regime. Meanwhile, 
progress is dependent on these countries implementing major reforms in areas such as 
the strengthening of the rule of law, combating organised crime, corruption and illegal 
migration, and strengthening their administrative capacity in border control and 
security in documents (Council of the European Union, 2003b). 
Based on the Thessaloniki Agenda, the Commission conducted exploratory talks with each of 
the Western Balkan countries. The relaxation of the visa regime was not only linked to the 
signing of an EC readmission agreements but more broadly to “substantial efforts by the 
countries in question” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006c, p.9). Due to the 
political salience of the issue in the Western Balkans, the promise of visa liberalisation has 
provided the EU with a particular strong lever. The Commission defined that through a ‘case by 
case approach’ each Western Balkan state may achieve visa liberalisation on its own merit. In 
addition, the countries’ status as candidates or potential candidates should be taken into account 
(Ibid).  
The very concrete go-ahead for the Commission to launch negotiations on EC visa facilitation 
and readmission agreements was granted on the Council meeting held on 13 and 14 November 
2006. The Commission initiated the negotiations with the countries in November 2006, except 
for Albania whose readmission agreement with the EC entered into force on 1 May 2006. In that 
case, the negotiations on a visa facilitation agreement started on 13 December 2006. All 
agreements were officially signed in September 2007 and entered into force on 1 January 2008.  
EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements are now a major means to push for further 
reforms. The European Commissioner Franco Frattini specified that negotiations for visa-free 
travel can only be started if a smooth and efficient functioning of visa facilitation and the 
readmission practices is guaranteed, along with efforts to improve effective cross-border police 
cooperation and measures against corruption (Frattini, 2006). According to the Commission 
enlargement strategy for 2008/9, each of the target countries will receive a ‘roadmap’ defining 
the exact conditions to be met. These documents will deal with the effective implementation of 
the readmission agreement, and cover other key areas such as border management, document 
security and measures against organised crime. “Such road-maps will allow the countries 
concerned to better focus their reform efforts, while also reinforcing the visibility of the EU’s 
commitment to the peoples of the region” (Commission of the European Communities, 2007c, 
p. 13).  
In brief, the Western Balkans qualified perfectly for testing the package of visa facilitation and 
readmission. These countries aspiring to join the EU have relatively close institutional ties with 
the EU and are in the immediate neighbourhood. The experiences gained in this geographical 
setting provided the EU with a model to be used in several neighbouring states. According to 
the European Commissioner Franco Frattini, the EU seeks to enhance the EU’s internal security 
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Union’s neighbourhood countries, on the model currently being developed in the Balkans” 
(Agence Europe, 04/05/2006).  
3.4  Is there a clear EU strategy on visa facilitation and readmission in the 
European Neighbourhood Policy? 
As mentioned earlier, the link between visa facilitation and readmission was made for the first 
time with the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. When their negotiations on an EC 
readmission agreement did not advance, the EU linked the negotiations to the incentive of visa 
facilitation. With Moldova being the next neighbouring state, visa facilitation and readmission 
were commonly negotiated right from the start. The EC-Moldovan negotiations on visa 
facilitation and readmission started in February 2007 and lasted until November 2007 with both 
agreements entering into force on 1 January 2008. Of course, after the end of negotiations with 
these countries the question remains: are they exceptional cases or rather pioneers that other 
neighbouring states may follow? Does the European Neighbourhood Policy contain a clear 
strategy on visa facilitation and readmission? 
The basic set-up of the European Neighbourhood Policy was outlined in the European 
Commission’s Communication on a ‘Wider Europe’, published in March 2003, followed by the 
more developed strategy on the ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’, published in May 2004. In 
the documents, the Commission did not delineate a clear strategy on visa facilitation and 
readmission. The ‘Wider Europe’ document only vaguely mentioned that the “EU could also 
consider the possibilities for facilitating the movement of citizens of neighbouring countries 
participating in EU programmes and activities” (Commission of the European Communities, 
2003a, p. 11). Holders of diplomatic and service passports should also possibly benefit from 
visa facilitation. On readmission, the documents were more precise. “Concluding readmission 
agreement with all the neighbours, starting with Morocco, Russia, Algeria, Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova, will be an essential element in joint efforts to curb illegal migration” (Ibid).  
Over time, the EU shaped a more precise strategy in the field. EC visa facilitation and 
readmission agreements are now considered a standard instrument in the ENP. The reasons for 
this strategic shift are twofold. On the one hand, the negotiations on an EC visa facilitation and 
readmission agreement with Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Moldova clarified how useful 
the incentive of visa facilitation is to achieve the objective of signing readmission agreements. 
On the other hand, more and more reports emphasising the negative perceptions of the ongoing 
visa practices made EU member states rethink their visa policy. The EU had to admit that “the 
length and cost of procedures for short-term visas (e.g. for business, researchers, students, 
tourists or even official travel) is a highly ‘visible’ disincentive to partner countries, and an 
obstacle to many of the ENP’s underlying objectives” (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2006a, pp. 3-4). When in 2006 the German Presidency intended to strengthen the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, visa facilitation became a major means to dispel the doubts of 
the ENP countries that the EU was not willing to make serious concessions. In its 
communication on how to strengthen the ENP, the Commission proposed that the “Union 
should be willing to enter negotiations on readmission and visa facilitation with each 
neighbouring country with an Action Plan in force, once the proper preconditions have been 
met” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006a, p.6, emphasis added).  
Hence, a major precondition is an ENP Action Plan in force. Most participating states now fulfil 
this requirement. Action Plans were agreed with Israel, Jordan Moldova, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Authority, Tunisia and Ukraine in 2005, with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 
2006, and with Egypt and Lebanon in 2007. The other countries neighbouring the EU do not yet EC VISA FACILITATION AND READMISSION AGREEMENTS | 15 
 
have such an agreement: Belarus, Libya and Syria are still excluded from the ENP structures;
13 
Algeria has decided not to negotiate an ENP Action Plan yet; and Russia refrained from 
participating in the ENP but agreed with the EU on a Strategic Partnership covering four 
“common spaces”.  
Table 2. Specific Action on Visa Facilitation and Readmission in the ENP Action Plans 
  ENP 
Action Plan 
Specific action on visa 
facilitation in ENP Action Plan 
Specific action on readmission 
in ENP Action Plan 
Algeria  No    
Armenia  Yes  “exchange views on visa issues” 
“initiate dialogue on readmission 
which could possibly lead to an 
EC – Armenia readmission 
agreement” 
Azerbaijan    “exchange views on visa issues” 
“initiate dialogue on readmission 
which could possibly lead in the 
future to an EC-Azerbaijan 
agreement in this area” 
Belarus  No    
Egypt  Yes 
“Cooperate in the field of 
improving the movement of 
persons, including to facilitate the 
uniform visa issuing procedures 
for certain agreed categories of 
persons” 
“Develop the cooperation 
between Egypt and EU on 
readmission, including 
negotiating readmission 
agreements between the parties, 
building on Article 69 of the 
Association Agreement” 
Georgia  Yes  “exchange information on visa 
issues” 
“Strengthen the dialogue and 
cooperation in preventing and 
fighting against illegal migration, 
which could possibly lead in the 
future to an EC-Georgia 
agreement on readmission” 
Israel  Yes  No short stay visa requirements  No specific action 
Jordan  Yes 
“In order to facilitate the 
circulation of persons, examine … 
possibilities of facilitation visa 
issuing (simplified and 
accelerated procedures in 
conformity with the acquis)” 
No specific action 
Lebanon  Yes 
“Cooperate on facilitating the 
movement of persons … in 
particular examining the scope for 
facilitating visa procedures for 
short stay for some categories of 
persons” 
“Improve cooperation … on all 
forms of readmission including 
the possibility of negotiating a 
readmission agreement” 
Libya  No    
Moldova  Yes  “initiate a dialogue on the 
possibilities of visa facilitation” 
“Initiate a dialogue on 
readmission in the perspective of 
                                                      
13 For a detailed analysis of the EU-Belarus relations, see G. Dura (2008), The EU’s Limited Response to 
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concluding a readmission 
agreement between Moldova and 
EU” 
Morocco  Yes 
“constructive dialogue 
…including examination of visa 
facilitation” 
“conclusion and implementation 
of balanced readmission 
agreement with the EC” 
Palestinian 
Authority  Yes  No specific action  No specific action 
Syria  No    
Tunisia  Yes 
“facilitating the movement of 
persons … by looking in 
particular at possibilities of 
relaxing short-stay visa 
formalities for certain categories 
of persons” 
“initiate a dialogue on return and 
readmission with a view to 
concluding a readmission 
agreement with the EU” 
Ukraine    “establish constructive dialogue 
on visa facilitation” 
“need for progress on the ongoing 
negotiations for an EC-Ukraine 
readmission agreement” 
Source: ENP Action Plans and Country Reports, downloadable on the homepage of the European Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm (last accessed on 30 January 2008).  
The figure shows that even though theoretically each neighbouring state may conclude an EC 
visa facilitation and readmission agreement, the concrete action in this field differ amongst 
them. In the visa domain, most often the clauses are rather vague referring to commonplaces 
such as “establishing constructive dialogues” or “exchange views”. In an interview for this 
analysis, a Commission official stated that if new EC visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements are to be negotiated, the Black Sea area would be treated as a priority. There is a 
tendency to consider this “fashionable area” first, according to an EU official.
14  
EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements may also become an important element in the 
EU’s efforts to develop a new ‘global approach on migration’. A different, more comprehensive 
migration policy was defined as a core objective at the October 2005 Summit at Hampton 
Court. Following the summit, the Commission proposed a whole set of new measures on 
irregular and legal migration focusing in geographic terms on Africa and the Mediterranean 
region. Under the heading of “Legal Migration”, the establishment of “mobility packages” with 
a range of interested third countries was recommended:  
There is a clear need to better organise the various forms of legal movement between 
the EU and third countries. Mobility packages would provide the overall framework for 
managing such movements and would bring together the possibilities offered by the 
Member States and the European Community, while fully respecting the division of 
competences as provided by the Treaty (Commission of the European Communities, 
2006b, p. 7).  
Mobility packages would then be the heading to manage legal migration flows with selected 
third countries, particularly from the neighbourhood, provided that they prove willing to 
cooperate on readmission, irregular migration and border management. These packages go 
beyond facilitated travel opportunities and also incorporate ideas on promoting circular 
migration (temporary or seasonal migration) and legal migration based on the labour needs of 
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interested EU member states.
15 In this privileged form of cooperation with selected third 
countries, visa facilitation and readmission policies will only be two components in a 
comprehensive cooperation on migration issues. In exchange for receiving new opportunities 
for legal migration, the third countries concerned will have to agree on far-reaching 
commitments that may even include measures “to promote productive employment and decent 
work, and more generally to improve the economic and social framework conditions […] as 
they may contribute to reducing the incentives for irregular migration” (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2007b, p. 4). 
In contrast, the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries are not considered as qualifying 
for EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements. The Cotonou agreement is regarded as a 
sufficient basis to make ACP countries cooperate on readmission. “The readmission obligations 
contained in Article 13 Cotonou is crucial, and is an appropriate basis for supplementary 
bilateral readmission agreements between EU Member States and selected ACP countries” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006b, p. 9). 
4.  The content and implications of EC visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements  
This section analyses the EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements in terms of substance 
and implications. They are considered in relation to each other and systematically assessed in 
terms of their similarities and differences.  
4.1   The content of EC visa facilitation agreements  
This part evaluates the visa facilitation agreements concluded with Serbia (2007f), Montenegro 
(2007e), Macedonia (2007b), Albania (2007c), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2007a), Moldova 
(2007d), Ukraine (2007h) and Russia (2007g) in terms of substance and content. 
The main purpose of the visa facilitation agreements is to facilitate, on the basis of reciprocity, 
the issuance of short-stay visas (90 days per period of 180 days). Long-stay visas remain within 
the authority of the member states. A visa-free travel regime is recognised in all agreements as 
the long-term objective. The wording of this objective differs slightly, however. In the visa 
facilitation agreement with Ukraine and Moldova the EU recognises the “introduction of a visa 
free travel regime […] as a long-term objective”. A similar clause is included in the agreement 
with Russia, where the parties reaffirmed “the intention to establish the visa-free travel”. The 
clearest statement for visa liberalisation was made in the agreements with the Western Balkans. 
In all agreements with the Western Balkan states, it was seen as the “first concrete step towards 
the visa free travel regime”.  
The main section of the EC visa facilitation agreements concern which categories of citizens 
may benefit from facilitated visa procedures. Attached to each category is the documentary 
evidence regarding the purpose of the journey. All EC visa facilitation agreements under 
research here include the following categories of citizens: 
a)  members of official delegations participating in meetings, consultations, negotiations, 
exchange programmes and events (in possession of official invitation) 
                                                      
15 The challenge in negotiating mobility packages is that they touch on areas of EU member state national 
competence as well as others that fall within the Community’s remit. For more details, see the 
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b)  business people and representatives of business organisations (with written request from a 
host legal person or company) 
c)  drivers of international cargo and passenger transportation services (with written request 
from the national association of carriers) 
d)  members of train, refrigerator and locomotive crews in international trains (with approval of 
competent company) 
e)  journalists (with certificate) 
f)  scientists and persons active in cultural and artistic activities, including university and other 
exchange programmes (with written request from host organisation) 
g)  pupils, students, post-graduate students and accompanying teachers (with written request or 
a certificate of enrolment from the host university) 
h)  participants in international sports events and persons accompanying them (with written 
request from the host organisation) 
i)  participants in official exchange with twin towns (with approval of host mayor) 
j)  close relatives (spouse, children, parents, grandparents, grandchildren) visiting their family 
legally residing in the EU (with written request) 
k)  relatives visiting for military or civil burial grounds (with official document confirming the 
fact of death). 
The agreement with Russia stops at this point. The one with Ukraine (and all others) include 
also the category of  
l)  persons visiting for medical reasons (with official document from host medical institution).  
The EC visa facilitation agreements with Moldova and the Western Balkans contain: 
m)  civil society organisations when undertaking trips for the purposes of educational training, 
seminars, conferences (with request from host institution) 
n)  professionals who participate in international exhibitions, conferences, symposia, seminars 
or similar events (with written request from host organisation) 
The agreements with the Western Balkan states are the farthest-reaching. They also include 
o)  tourists (with certificate or voucher from a travel agency or a tour operator)  
p)  religious communities (with approval from registered religious community) 
Only the one with Albania contains  
q)  persons politically persecuted during the communist regime (with a certificate issued by the 
Institute for the Integration of the Persecuted Persons)  
The agreements are almost identical in their wording. The ordering of the categories differs, 
however. Interestingly, the visa facilitation agreement with Macedonia is the only one that does 
not begin with “members of official delegations” but with students, scientists and members of 
the civil community. In term of categories of persons eligible for multiple-entry visas, the visa 
facilitation agreements with the Western Balkan states are again the more comprehensive ones. 
All categories mentioned beforehand may apply for a multiple entry-visa with the exception of 
tourists. However, only members of official delegations, national or regional governments and 
parliaments, close family members visiting their relatives in the EU, business people and 
journalists may apply for a multiple-entry visa with a term of validity up to five years. The 
multiple-entry visa for all other categories may be valid for one year only.  EC VISA FACILITATION AND READMISSION AGREEMENTS | 19 
 
The agreements fix the fee for processing visa applications for all citizens of the target country 
at €35. In the EC visa facilitation agreements with Russia and Ukraine, a clause adds that the 
fees increase to €70, if the request is urgent (3 days before departure). However, there are some 
reservations to this stipulation e.g. close relatives, pupils and students will continue to pay the 
reduced fee of €35 even if the request is urgent.
16  
The EC visa facilitation agreements provide certain categories of citizens with the waiving of 
the visa fees. The least comprehensive agreement in terms of persons benefiting from the 
waiving of the visa fee is the EC-Russian visa facilitation agreement, followed by the ones with 
Ukraine and Moldova.  
Table 3. Categories of Persons Benefiting from a Waiving of the Visa Fee 
  Russia  Ukraine  Moldova  Western Balkan states 
close relatives 
(spouses, children, parents, 
grandparents, grandchildren) 
X X X  X 
members of official delegations 
members  X X X  X 
regional or national government and 
parliaments, Constitutional Courts or 
Supreme Courts 
X X X   
pupils, students and post-graduate 
students and accompanying teachers  X X X  X 
disabled persons and those 
accompanying them  X X X  X 
persons travelling on humanitarian 
grounds, including medical purposes  X X X  X 
participants in international sports 
events and persons accompanying them   X  X  X 
participants in youth international 
sports events  X      
participants in scientific, cultural and 
artistic activities  X X X  X 
participants in official exchange 
programmes organised by twin cities  X X X  X 
journalists   X  X  X 
pensioners   X  X  X 
drivers of international cargo and 
passenger transportation   X  X  X 
members of train, refrigerator and 
locomotive crews   X  X  X 
children under the age of 18 and 
dependent children under the age of 21   X    
members of professions participating in 
international exhibitions, conferences, 
symposia, seminars or similar events 
   X  X 
participants representatives of civil      X  
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society organisations 
representatives of religious 
communities      X  
Children under the age of 6.        X 
mayors and members of municipal 
councils      Only  Macedonia 
Politically persecuted persons during 
the communist regime      Only  Albania 
Source: Authors’ summary compiled from EC visa facilitation agreements Serbia (2007f), Montenegro 
(2007e), Macedonia (2007b), Albania (2007c), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2007a), Moldova (2007d), 
Ukraine (2007h)and Russia (2007g). 
The agreements with Macedonia and Serbia contain the additional clause that Bulgaria and 
Romania, both of which are not yet bound by the Schengen acquis, may also waive the fees for 
processing national short stay visas for citizens of those two countries. 
The decision on the visa application shall be taken within ten calendar days. This period, may 
be extended up to 30 calendar days, notably when further scrutiny of the person applying is 
needed. The agreements are jointly managed and monitored by a committee composed of 
Commission officials, assisted by experts from the member states, and the partner countries’ 
officials. The committee may suggest amendments or additions to the present agreement and 
settle disputes arising from it. It meets at least once a year but may do so more often, if 
necessary.  
A Protocol annexed to the agreement clarifies the implications of the agreement for the states 
that do not fully apply the Schengen acquis. The UK and Ireland, not included in the territorial 
validity of the agreement, were invited to conclude bilateral agreements. The EC visa 
facilitation agreements do not apply to Denmark, Iceland and Norway either, which were asked 
to conclude bilateral agreements, in similar terms, with target third-countries.  
In some agreements, a special reference was made to EC Regulation No 1931/2006 concerning 
the establishment of a system of local border traffic. Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania 
declared their willingness to negotiate a local border traffic regime with Ukraine. In the Western 
Balkans, Macedonia will negotiate one with Bulgaria, Serbia another with Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Romania. Moldova and Romania also declared their willingness to establish a local border 
traffic regime.  
The agreements intend to make the procedures for issuing short stay visas more transparent. 
Better information on the validity, the documents necessary and minimum requirements shall be 
given. The visa facilitation agreement with Moldova is the only one that declares the intention 
to improve the EU presence in the country and set up a common application centre in Chisinau. 
The visa facilitation agreements with the Western Balkans end by acknowledging their intention 
to “give a wider definition to the notion of family members that should benefit from visa 
facilitation”. The wish particularly concerns siblings and their children. “The European 
Community invites the Member States’ consular offices to make full use of the existing 
possibilities in the acquis communautaire for facilitating the issuance of visas to this category of 
persons, including in particular, the simplification of documentary evidence requested for the 
applicants, exemptions from handling fees and where appropriate the issuance of multiple entry 
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4.2  The implications on the visa facilitation side  
The EC visa facilitation agreements with Russia entered into force in June 2007 and those with 
Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans on 1 January 2008. Due to this short period, it is too 
early to assess the impact of the visa facilitation agreements in terms of modified visa data. 
According to the visa data collection of Council secretariat and Commission, the EU member 
states issued 11,709,251 visas worldwide in 2005.
17  
Table 4. EU Visa data for the year 2005 
Group 1    Group 2   
Russia 2,833,392  China  592,644 
Ukraine 1,348,162  India  292,861 
Belarus 629,849  Iran  104,898 
Serbia & Montenegro  541,244 Kazakhstan 104,166 
Turkey 532,177  Lebanon 74,299 
Albania 136,569  Indonesia 67,931 
Bosnia & Herzegovina  128,750  Pakistan  40,243 
Moldova 61,941  Syria  37,708 
Georgia 40,322  Vietnam  35,372 
Armenia 21,911  Jordan  31,449 
Croatia 17,545  Sri  Lanka  16,984 
Azerbaijan 16,541  Uzbekistan  12,232 
Macedonia 14,066  Bangladesh  11,808 
   Kirgizstan  8,930 
   Iraq  6,563 
   Turkmenistan  4,033 
   Afghanistan  3,526 
   Tajikistan  1,735 
Total Group 1  6,322,469  Total Group 2  1,447,382 
Information: Transit A visas are not included.  
Source: Visa data collection managed by the Council secretariat and the Commission (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2007a, p. 78). 
In terms of substance, the EC visa facilitation agreements with the Western Balkans are the 
more comprehensive ones. They contain the clearest statement for visa-free travel and more 
categories of citizens that benefit from facilitated travel, including tourists in particular. The 
EC-Russian visa facilitation agreement is at the other end of the scale. “The present – not very 
ambitious – agreement on the facilitation of visas is an example of the essentially pragmatic 
way in which [the EU-Russian] relations are unfolding”, according to the assessment of the 
European Parliament (European Parliament, 2006, p. 6). It considered the agreement lacking a 
“human rights and democracy clause” and demands that “conditionality must also be a 
cornerstone of EU external policy on visas”, particularly with regard to the “rules of democracy 
and the rule of law” (European Parliament, 2006, p. 9).  
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The benefit of all EC visa facilitation agreements is to fix the price for processing the visa 
application for all citizens at €35, and to waive the fees for certain categories of persons. 
Therefore the target countries are not affected by the Council Decision of 1 June 2006 which 
“readjusted” the visa application processing costs at €60 “to cover the additional costs […] 
corresponding to the introduction of biometrics and the VIS” (Council of the European Union, 
2006).  
However, viewed from the perspective of the target countries, the fixing of the prize at €35 does 
not imply a positive change but rather the prolongation or, in some cases, a deterioration of the 
status quo. In terms of applying for a short-stay visa to the long-term participating Schengen 
states, the situation remains unchanged. Third-country citizens travelling to, say, Spain or 
Germany continue to pay the same amount, as opposed to the increased fee of €60. In terms of 
applying for a short-stay visa to the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe, the 
situation deteriorated despite the EC visa facilitation agreement entering into force. On 
December 21
st, 2007, the new member states of Central and Eastern Europe (with the exception 
of Cyprus, Bulgaria and Romania) joined the Schengen area and lifted their border controls to 
the West. The transitional period, i.e. the period after these states obtained membership but prior 
to their full implementation of the Schengen Treaty, came to an end. Within this transitional 
period, the new member states were allowed to issue visas for neighbouring states free of charge 
or for a low fee and on relatively uncomplicated terms. Poland, for instance, issued 560,000 
visas annually for Ukraine citizens which is nearly double as many as all Schengen states 
combined (290,000) (Boratynski et al., 2006b, pp. 2-3). The visa procedures were not only 
cheaper or free of charge, but also the procedures were simpler, the waiting time shorter and the 
rejection rate significantly lower (in case of Poland for Ukraine 1.2% as compared to 11.5% in 
case of the Schengen states (Ibid). In accordance to the Schengen acquis, the new member states 
are now in charge of controlling the external Schengen border which implies the full adherence 
of the strict Schengen entry rules. Instead of issuing visas free of charge, countries such as 
Poland now have to charge €35 for issuing a short-stay visa. The EC visa facilitation 
agreements do not provide for special arrangements for the new member states vis-à-vis their 
neighbours. Hence, “paradoxically, though in principle the [visa facilitation] agreement is to 
ease the situation, after the New Member States accession to the Schengen area, it will worsen” 
(Boratynski et al., 2006b, p. 3).
18 
There is one measure, however, that should explicitly prevent negative side-effects of the 
Schengen Eastern Enlargement: the establishment of local border traffic regimes. The issuing of 
‘local border traffic permits’ for border residents is an important measure to foster good 
neighbourly relations between border regions at the EU’s external borders. As mentioned above, 
there are close socio-economic links between the new member states in Central and Eastern 
Europe and their neighbours to the East and South-East. Many families still manage subsistence 
on shuttle-trading of foodstuff or other goods in between the border regions. For them, an 
uncomplicated crossing of the EU external border is of high interest. The local border traffic 
concerns residents living in a border zone of 50 km and authorises them to move freely in the 
border zones of both countries. Due to this set-up, however, the local border traffic regime 
potentially affects only a comparatively small number of citizens in a closely circumscribed 
area. At the Ukrainian border with Poland, the local border traffic may include only Uzhhorod 
as a larger town with more than 100,000 inhabitants (Boratynski et al., 2006b, p. 3). It is also 
worth mentioning that residents of border regions often search for other, more comprehensive 
venues to move freely into the EU. A comparatively unproblematic way for citizens of countries 
such as Moldova or Macedonia has been to benefit from the neighbouring country’s status as 
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EU member state. Many Macedonians have therefore applied for a Bulgarian passport, many 
Moldovans for a Romanian or Bulgarian one. Angel Marin, Bulgaria’s vice president, 
announced in January 2008 that “between 2002 and 2007, some 39,000 Macedonians and as 
many Moldovans applied for Bulgarian passports. […] Of those, some 13,925 Macedonians and 
10,613 Moldovans were granted passports” (quoted in EU business, 2008). In Moldova, there is 
a Bulgarian minority of 60,000 to 80,000 and in Macedonia, Bulgaria considers the country’s 
Slavic population as being of Bulgarian origin and therefore easily grants passports (Ibid). EU 
officials are aware of the seriousness of this problem. In an interview, a high diplomat of an EU 
member state voiced concerns that  
the Bulgarians will come sooner or later to claim territory from the Macedonian state 
when one day the majority [in some border regions to Bulgaria] will possess a 
Bulgarian citizenship. Once, they will even somehow understandably pose the 
question: What is the foundation of statehood in these areas?
19  
In light of this development, it is questionable if the local border traffic is a sufficient answer 
although it clearly is an asset to many border residents living at the EU’s external border.  
The waiving of the visa fees for certain parts of the population, the speedier processing of the 
visa application (normally 10 calendar days), the possibility of multiple-entry visas to certain 
categories of people and a shorter list of documents required are plus points the EC visa 
facilitation agreements bring about. The visa procedures, including the length of the visa 
application procedure and the long list of documents required, were often conceived as 
troublesome and lacking transparency. According to an EU visa policy monitoring survey of 
eight EU member states in four Eastern European countries conducted by the Stefan Batory 
Foundation (Boratynski et al., 2006a), the length of procedures differed considerably among the 
EU member states, ranging on average from two days in the case of Poland over eight days in 
Germany up to 14 days in the case of the Czech Republic. What is more, the consular practices 
on how to issue a short stay visa equally differed among EU member states. Applicants were 
frequently required to wait for hours in queues, did not receive reliable information on which 
documents were needed, and, in case a document was lacking, needed to return personally with 
the missing one. Usually consulates do not accept documents sent by post or e-mail, implying 
that the applicant has to come again. As the relevant consulate is usually a long distance from 
the applicant’s place (according to the EU visa policy monitoring survey (2006a, p. 18), the 
average distance to the closest consulate was 300 km) the numerous visits may turn out to be 
costly and burdensome. Getting a Schengen visa could therefore be a “bureaucratic and costly 
nightmare”, as once even Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn (2006) admitted. The EC visa 
facilitation agreements explicitly aim at making these bureaucratic routines less cumbersome 
and more transparent, notably through the newly installed joint committee. It is in charge of 
providing for a smooth implementation of the agreement and of suggesting amendments or 
additions to the agreement. Therefore the committee may assume an important role in ensuring 
fair and transparent visa application procedures. The smooth implementation of the agreement is 
of particular relevance in view of visa liberalisation as a long-term objective.  
The EC visa facilitation agreements have one major disadvantage, however. They divide the 
society of the target country into two groups  
the privileged few who can get a multiple-entry visa, benefit from the simplified 
procedure […], or profit from the waiving of the application fee for the visa, and as to 
the remainder: the vast majority of ordinary citizens who cannot enjoy such 
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advantages. This can create a feeling of discrimination and lead to the conclusion that 
the European Union is interested only in the […] elite (Boratynski et al., 2006b, p. 2). 
A self-evident implication of this separation is that the non-privileged ones may try to obtain the 
same advantages than the privileged ones possibly leading to an increased level of corruption. 
Some may attempt a bribe to get also the privileged status of, say, a journalist or a driver of 
international cargo. 
It is still too early to assess the quality of the implementation of the EC visa facilitation 
agreements. In interviews for this analysis, some experts pointed to initial problems in 
implementing the stipulations of the agreements, however. Certain EU member states would 
circumvent the reduced fee of €35 by charging additional fees for processing the visa 
application. Such practices were reported by the French consulate in Russia and by several EU 
member states in Ukraine. In Ukraine, another problem would be that EU member states had not 
received updated instructions on how to issue visas under the EC visa facilitation agreement by 
the time the agreement entered into force. Therefore, despite the new stipulations in force, the 
bureaucratic practices have hitherto not changed significantly.
20 
4.3  The content of EC readmission agreements  
Readmission agreements generally cover procedural provisions regarding return procedure, 
transit return arrangements, responsibility criteria, standard of proof, time limits and cost 
distribution, although the exact nature of these procedures can vary significantly. The most 
difficult issue to agree upon is the readmission of third country nationals and stateless persons. 
The contestable points lie in approving the travel route of those migrants and providing 
evidence of the fact that they had transited the country before entering the EU’s territory. The 
proof of nationality is highly critical, too. According to the European Commission, other 
controversial technical issues include the time limits applicable, the use of the EU standard 
travel document for expulsion, the means of evidence including prima facie evidence, and the 
use of charter flights (Schieffer, 2003, p. 354). In addition, the relation between a new 
Community agreement and possibly existing bilateral agreements with individual member states 
will have to be assessed. 
The European Commission pursues a standard approach in negotiating readmission agreements 
with third countries and seeks to achieve final texts that have as many common features as 
possible. Thus, the EU’s set of demands and expectations is the same for each of the third 
countries. The first draft of the texts that the Commission transmits to its negotiation partners 
typically does not vary widely. During negotiations, single adjustments are required according 
to the respective country’s objections and demands, so that ultimately agreements will differ. 
The readmission agreements the Community signed so far with Albania, Bosnia, Hong Kong, 
Macao, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine, are divided 
into seven or eight sections with 21 to 23 articles altogether: 
•  Purpose of the agreement: rapid and effective procedures for identification and repatriation 
of persons who do not, or no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry, residence or presence; 
•  Definitions; 
•  Readmission obligations: covering own nationals, third country nationals and stateless 
persons; 
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•  Readmission procedure: time limits, common application forms, means of evidence, transfer 
modalities, modes of transport; 
•  Transit operations: extent of support to be given by the requested state; circumstances to 
refuse or revoke transit permission; 
•  Costs, data protection and non-affection of international rights and obligations; 
•  Implementation and practical application; 
•  Final provisions: entry into force, duration, termination, and legal status of annexes. 
All agreements include several annexes regarding documents considered as proof or prima facie 
evidence of nationality, and of proof or prima facie evidence of the conditions for readmission 
of third country nationals and stateless persons. Some of them also contain common statements 
regarding the meaning of the agreement for Denmark, Norway, and Iceland. 
Besides this overall similar structure, substantial differences in the agreements exist: 
•  Readmission obligations of the signatories: Ukraine is the only country for which the 
agreement does not differentiate between the obligations by the Community on the one hand 
and the contracting state on the other hand. 
•  Persons to be readmitted: The agreements with Bosnia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro 
and Serbia explicitly state that signatories shall also readmit minor unmarried children of 
the person to be readmitted as well as spouses holding another nationality unless they have 
an independent right of residence. The agreements with Russia and Ukraine require 
readmission “irrespective of the will of the person to be readmitted”. 
•  Readmission procedure: Several states have introduced an accelerated procedure if a person 
has been apprehended in the border region after irregularly crossing the border coming 
directly from the territory of the requested state (Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, 
Ukraine). In this case, the requesting state may submit a readmission application within two 
working days of this person’s apprehension. 
•  Time limits: The time limit for submitting a readmission application varies between six 
(Moldova) and twelve (Albania) months. The time limit for replying to the application 
varies between 10 working days (Serbia) and 25 calendar days (Russia). Possible extensions 
lay in between 2 working days (Moldova) and 60 calendar days (Russia). The requested 
validity of readmission travel documents lies between 30 days (Russia) and six months 
(Albania). The requesting state has to decide about a transit procedure in a certain time 
period, which varies between 4 (Moldova) and 10 (Ukraine) working days. For Russia, no 
time limit has been specified. 
•  Transit procedure: Ukraine is the only country specifying conditions for escorts in case of 
transit of third-country nationals or stateless persons. 
•  Entry into force: The obligations concerning the readmission of third-country nationals and 
stateless persons defined in the agreements between the EC and Albania, Russia and 
Ukraine shall only become applicable after a certain transition period. For Albania and 
Ukraine, this transition period was agreed to be two years after the agreement entered into 
force; in the case of Russia, this is a three-year period. In contrast to the Albanian 
agreement, which was signed in 2005, the agreements for Russia and Ukraine signed in 
2007 foresee that during the transition period, these obligations shall only be applicable to 
stateless persons and nationals from third-countries with which bilateral arrangements on 
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On the one hand these differences relate to the different geographic conditions, political 
situations and histories of the signatory countries. On the other hand, however, changes evolved 
over time when the EC became increasingly experienced in negotiating readmission agreements. 
This can be very well illustrated by means of the non-affection clause. Here, pressure from the 
European Parliament and NGOs resulted in modification of the wording over time. In the case 
of Hong Kong and Macao, the clause had the following wording: 
This Agreement shall be without prejudice to rights, obligations and responsibilities 
arising from International Law applicable to the Community, the Member States and 
the Hong Kong SAR (Council of the European Union, 2002b, p. 23).  
After the European Parliament and several human rights organisations had strongly criticised 
this non-affection clause for not explicitly referring to human rights or refugee law, the 
agreement with Sri Lanka included the following wording: 
This Agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights, obligations and responsibilities 
of the Community, the Member States and Sri Lanka arising from International Law 
and, in particular, from any applicable International Convention or agreement to which 
they are Parties (Council of the European Union, 2003a, p. 24). 
Again, criticism was harsh. In consequence, the wording of the Albanian agreement became 
more precise:  
This Agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights, obligations and responsibilities 
of the Community, the Member States and Albania arising from International Law and, 
in particular, from the European Convention of 4 November 1950 for the Protection of 
Human Rights, the Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 on 
the Status of Refugees, and international instruments on extradition (Council of the 
European Union, 2005, p. 22).  
The agreement, which was signed next, was that with the Russian Federation. Even though it 
does not call it “non-affection clause” but “relation to other international obligations”, the list of 
legal documents to be considered became even longer: 
1. This Agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights, obligations and 
responsibilities of the Community, the Member States and the Russian Federation 
arising from International Law and, in particular, from: 
(a)  the Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 on the Status 
of Refugees; 
(b)  the European Convention of 4 November 1950 for the Protection of Human 
Rights,  
(c)  the Convention of 10 December 1984 against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 
(d)  international treaties on extradition and transit; 
(e)  multilateral international treaties containing rules on the readmission of foreign 
nationals, such as the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 7 December 
1944 (Council of the European Union, 2007i, Article 18). 
The agreements with Bosnia, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia additionally refer to 
the international conventions determining the state responsible for examining applications for 
asylum. Instead, the agreement with Ukraine additionally refers to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights of 10 December 1948 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
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For the first time, the readmission agreement with Russia makes explicitly clear that provisions 
of the EC readmission agreement shall take precedence over provisions of any bilateral 
arrangements on readmission. Since then this clarification has been part of all new agreements.  
After being in force, each EC readmission agreement will establish a readmission joint 
committee, which shall consist of representatives of the third country and of the Commission 
acting on behalf of the European Community. The latter shall be assisted by experts from 
member states. The joint committee will be responsible for the implementation of the 
agreement. Furthermore, The European Commission’s Directorate General ‘Justice, Freedom, 
and Security’ is supported by the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), 
which coordinates, along with others, the operational aspects of removal of irregular third 
country nationals and thus plays a decisive role in the implementation of readmission 
agreements (for more details, see Carrera, 2007; Jorry, 2007). 
4.4  The implications on the readmission side 
Data on return is scarce. On the one hand, only limited reliable EU-wide data exist which 
differentiate between voluntary and forced return; on the other hand, countries of origin most 
often lack information about the numbers of returnees. Only recently, the European 
Commission published a working document on “Preparing the next steps in border management 
in the European Union” containing national statistical data on refused entry, apprehension of 
irregular migrants, and removal.
21 The data can only serve as a vague indicator because EU 
member states did not agree upon common criteria and definitions, and some of them provided 
only incomplete information. Therefore, we have to assume that actual numbers are higher than 
indicated here. 
Figure 1. Total Number of Removed Aliens (EU-27) 
246,893
215,161 209,409 201,870
2003 2004 2005 2006
 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (2008). 
Unfortunately, the data has not been broken down into rejected asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants. Furthermore, because no information has been given about the countries to which 
removal was implemented, we have to consider that out of the total, an indeterminate number of 
individuals were simply being re-cycled within the EU, which means they were returned to 
another EU country from which they had arrived. The total numbers of removed aliens were 
distributed among member states as follows: 
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Table 5. Total Number of Removed Aliens (2003-2006) 
2003 2004 2005 2006
Austria 11,070 9,408 5,239 4,904
Belgium 9,996 9,647 10,302 9,264
Bulgaria 814 1,271 1,608 1,501
Cyprus 3,307 2,982 3,015 3,222
Czech Republic 2,602 2,649 2,730 1,228
Denmark 3,100 3,093 2,225 1,986
Germany 30,176 26,807 19,988 15,407
Estonia 171 101 60 91
Finland 2,773 2,775 1,900 1,410
France 11,692 15,672 18,120 21,271
Greece 40,930 35,942 51,079 54,756
Hungary 4,804 3,980 4,348 3,057
Ireland n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Italy 31,013 27,402 24,001 16,597
Latvia 375 234 162 141
Lithuania 846 306 182 168
Luxembourg n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Malta 847 680 962 781
Netherlands 23,206 17,775 12,386 12,669
Poland 5,879 6,042 5,141 9,272
Portugal 2,798 3,507 6,162 1,079
Romania 500 650 616 680
Slovenia 3,209 2,632 3,133 3,173
Slovakia 1,293 2,528 2,569 2,185
Spain 26,757 27,364 25,359 33,235
Sweden 7,355 11,714 8,122 3,793
United Kingdom 21,380 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 246,893 215,161 209,409 201,870 
Source: Commission of the European Communities 2008. 
Because data is scarce and EU member states do not provide any data or estimations for the 
future, the transit countries with which the EU signed or seeks to sign Community readmission 
agreements face great difficulties assessing the numbers of returnees – both their own nationals 
as well as third country nationals – they have to expect from EU member states after the 
Community readmission agreement takes effect. This uncertainty creates severe difficulties 
because authorities are in the dark regarding personnel and administrative capacities required; 
the extent of reintegration programmes, assistance and job training required; and the scope of 
detention facilities needed. In addition, it is rather difficult to prioritise with which countries of 
origin they should begin to negotiate bilateral readmission agreements because they lack 
experience to help them anticipate which third-country nationals EU member states will readmit 
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The problems transit countries face on the basis of readmission agreements with the EU relate to 
three different groups of people: a. their own state nationals; b. third country nationals; c. 
asylum seekers. 
 Own State Nationals 
As agreed in international customary law, each state is obliged to take back its own nationals. 
However, since most often the number of nationals from EU neighbouring countries who 
migrated irregularly to the EU is substantially high, their return creates major difficulties for the 
home country. First of all, remittances often play a major role in the transit country’s economy 
meaning that many families simply depend upon money transfer from relatives who work 
abroad irregularly. Return may very well result in the destruction of their economic basis and 
their deterioration into poverty. Secondly, irregular migrants most often stem from remote or 
rural areas, but when being returned, these migrants prefer to stay in or around the capital or 
major cities. As a consequence, their families may leave their villages to join their relatives so 
that authorities have to deal with internal migration and rapid urbanisation. Another important 
implication of return is re-emigration. At least in the case of forced return, many migrants look 
for possibilities to go abroad again because they lack an acceptable prospect in their home 
country. In all these dimensions, even the return of its own nationals is a rather complex issue 
that brings about a lot of challenges for transit countries. 
 Third Country Nationals 
Even more challenging is the return of third country nationals to transit countries. Almost none 
of the transit countries around the EU has any experience in readmitting third country nationals 
to their home countries, and in most cases, readmission agreements with countries of origin are 
lacking. Because neither the governments of the transit countries nor relevant international 
organisations nor the EU itself are in a position to reliably predict the potential level of third 
country nationals that will be returned by EU member states, measures providing for the 
implementation of third country national readmission are subject to uncertainty. The 
institutional infrastructure of government authorities is insufficiently developed, and the 
personnel lack experience in carrying out the various steps of the return procedure. Proper 
communication among various organisational units is not provided for, the technical equipment 
is insufficient, and the staff is untrained regarding human rights aspects of the situation and 
respect for migrants and their needs. Facilities for adequate lodging and accommodation are 
non-existent, and the return of migrants to their home countries is nearly impossible given all 
the administrative, organisational, and financial implications of readmission. Therefore, transit 
countries are in the risk of being left with substantial numbers of aliens posing a social and 
economic burden and turning these countries into countries of destination in the end. 
 Asylum Seekers 
Readmission agreements not only provide for the return of irregular migrants but also for that of 
rejected asylum-seekers. Sending an asylum-seeker to another state where no persecution is 
feared is not explicitly forbidden by international law – and that is exactly what readmission 
agreements are about. According to the Geneva Refugee Convention and its principle of non-
refoulement, receiving states are obliged to examine the claim before returning the applicant to a 
third country, to verify that the individual applicant will really be safe. However, cases of 
expulsion without prior examination of the claim are common, and in many cases return 
procedures are rather informal and the returning state merely informs the receiving country of 
the planned return (Landgren, 1999, p. 26). The majority of bilateral readmission agreements 30 | TRAUNER & KRUSE 
 
between EU member states and third countries do not contain any explicit reference to the 
principle of non-refoulement.
22 Even though the notion of ‘safe third countries’ requires that 
these countries have signed international agreements, most importantly the Geneva Refugee 
Convention and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, their proper implementation is not considered. Readmission agreements do not 
explicitly oblige the ‘safe third country’ to assure asylum seekers access to a fair refugee 
determination procedure in line with international standards. In addition, returning states might 
not even make clear that the individual is an asylum seeker who has been refused on formal 
grounds of the ‘safe third country’ rule. Chain deportation might be the consequence (for more 
details, see Kruse, 2006). 
The moment the readmission of third country nationals from the EU to neighbouring transit 
countries begins, their asylum system, which most often is young and very weak might be put at 
risk. If EU member states make quite extensive use of the possibility of readmitting third 
country nationals to neighbouring transit countries, and if substantial numbers of these apply for 
asylum in these countries, the systems might soon be over-loaded. Governments in transit 
countries already have severe difficulties adhering to time limits, providing interpreter services 
communicating promptly with applicants, and running shelters for asylum seekers. These 
difficulties will get even worse when the number of applications rises. Furthermore, sustainable 
local integration of refugees is very difficult, especially because of the often disastrous 
economic situation in the transit countries. Moreover, not only rejected asylum seekers but also 
irregular migrants can apply for asylum upon return, and it can be assumed that substantial 
numbers of irregular migrants might have a severe claim for protection. 
If one assumes that most of the transit countries are not ‘safe third countries’ of asylum 
according to UNHCR criteria we can conclude that the return of rejected asylum seekers might 
imply a lowering of asylum standards below internationally accepted standards. The rights of 
asylum seekers – to have a minimum quality of living conditions during the procedure, to obtain 
necessary information, to have a transparent and fair procedure and to have access to an 
independent appeal process – might be violated on the part of EU member states. 
In sum, readmission agreements as such mainly bring about negative consequences and difficult 
challenges of varying dimensions for countries of origin or transit (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2002b, p. 26). The negative effects for transit countries very much outweigh 
those of sending countries because transit countries have to deal with the onward repatriation of 
third country nationals. 
We have seen that it is unclear how many irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers EU 
member states intend to readmit. In addition, it is still an open question how many they really 
can readmit in the end, for two reasons. First, if the limited capacities of transit countries are 
exhausted, it might no longer be in the interests of the EU to continue readmitting people 
because the Union has a basic interest in economic, social, and political stability in 
neighbouring regions. Second, it is difficult to assess in how many cases member states’ 
authorities have the ability to unambiguously identify the individual’s nationality or to provide 
sufficient proof of migration routes. This is a very difficult undertaking, and very often 
readmission fails because of insufficient proofs. Thus, even if Community readmission 
agreements will be implemented in an exemplary way, an important question – probably also a 
quantitative one – remains for EU member states: how to deal with irregular migrants whose 
nationality or migration routes cannot be identified with sufficient certainty?  
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The question remains whether readmission agreements are at all an effective tool for managing 
migration flows, however, also in cases where a sufficiently certain testing of nationality of 
irregular migrants could be found. If readmitted migrants do receive no support to reintegrate 
themselves in their home countries or, even worse, run ashore in a foreign transit country, there 
is nothing that prevents them from trying to enter a European Union member state again. 
Similarly, it seems to be questionable at least that readmission agreements function as a 
deterrent and will substantially decrease the flow of irregular migrants to the EU as long as the 
reasons that make people leave their country and migrate towards the EU persist.  
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper has been to assess EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements in 
terms of objectives, substance and implications.  
The analysis has considered the instrument of EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements 
as a major means to implement a new EU security approach in the neighbourhood. The EU 
deemed it necessary to balance two conflicting needs: distancing itself from an outside 
perceived as insecure and strongly controlling its external border lines versus establishing closer 
relationships with the neighbouring non-EU countries in order to stabilise its surrounding world. 
It is this predicament that made the EU develop a new security approach understood as the 
explicit attempt to balance between internal security concerns and external stabilisation needs. 
EC visa facilitation and readmission agreements were a chief means in doing so since they were 
regarded as beneficial to both sides. The EU was given a strong lever to make third countries 
sign readmission agreements and pressure for domestic reforms in justice and home affairs, 
whereas in the target countries a major cause of discontent was softened by relaxing the tight 
visa regime and allowing facilitated travel opportunities for bona fide travellers. Moreover, 
governments of third countries got the opportunity to present themselves domestically as 
successful negotiators on the international level. The link between visa facilitation and 
readmission was made for the first time with the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. When 
their negotiations on an EC readmission agreement did not advance, the EU linked the 
negotiations to the incentive of visa facilitation. In the Western Balkans, visa facilitation and 
readmission were commonly negotiated right from the start (with the exception of Albania). 
This regional setting in South-Eastern Europe provided the EU with a model to be used from 
now on in several neighbouring states. EC visa liberalisation and readmission agreements may 
become a standard foreign policy instrument in the European Neighbourhood Policy.  
In a next step, the analysis has systematically assessed the EC visa facilitation and readmission 
agreements in terms of content and implications. In terms of substance, the EC visa facilitation 
agreements with the Western Balkans are the more comprehensive ones. They contain the 
clearest statement for visa-free travel and more categories of citizens that benefit from 
facilitated travel, including tourists in particular. The agreements with Ukraine and Moldova are 
in the middle and the EC-Russian visa facilitation agreement at the other end of the scale. The 
major benefits of the visa facilitation agreements are to arrange more relaxed travel 
opportunities for certain categories of the population, to fix the price for all citizens at €35, to 
ensure more transparent and quicker visa application procedures, to govern the establishment of 
local border traffic regimes and to give the perspective of free visa travel in case of a smooth 
implementation of the agreement. The main disadvantage is that it separates the population of 
the target country into two groups – those entitled to the privileges and those who are not. 
Moreover, the Schengen Eastern Enlargement somehow undermines the positive achievements 
by making the Central and Eastern European Countries strengthen their entry conditions and 
stop their practice of issuing visas free of charge or for a low fee and on relatively 
uncomplicated terms. The EC visa facilitation agreements fall short of sufficiently 32 | TRAUNER & KRUSE 
 
compensating for these changed circumstances. In the context of readmission agreements, the 
most difficult issue to agree upon is the return of third country nationals and stateless persons. 
In this regard, three countries have reached concessions in terms of time. While Albania and 
Ukraine negotiated for a two-year transitional period before the obligations concerning the 
readmission of third-country nationals and stateless persons shall become applicable, Russia 
attained a three-year delay. Another important difference between agreements is whether they 
introduce an accelerated procedure for persons that have been apprehended in the border 
regions. The main advantage of readmission agreements from the EC’s points of views is that 
the Community gets hold of a legal instrument in order to force transit countries to readmit not 
only their own but also third country nationals. However, from the point of view of non-EC 
countries, EC readmission agreements as such only bring about negative consequences, which 
in the end might put their economic, social and political stability at risk.  
6. Recommendations 
Based on the conclusions, the following policy-related recommendations can be given.  
•  EU member states should take the considerations of neighbouring states seriously and use 
the visa facilitation agreements to implement a more user-friendly policy. Issuing a visa 
should be done in a transparent and comprehensible procedure and not be seen as a 
privilege. 
•  The implementation of the EC visa facilitation agreements should be based on the premise 
that a modification of the EU’s negative visa list is realistic and feasible on condition that 
the cooperation functions effectively. Road Maps, similar to the ones the Western Balkans 
are given, should be drafted for all target third-countries to clarify the specific conditions 
and criteria needed for the objective of visa-free travel.  
•  The stipulations foreseen to soften the negative side-effects of the Schengen Eastern 
Enlargement should be smoothly implemented (e.g. the Polish-Ukrainian negotiations on a 
local border traffic regime were still ongoing at the time of writing).
23 Other measures in 
this respect e.g. a lower fee for the issuance of visas should be subject to discussions in the 
joint committees implementing the EC visa facilitation agreements.  
•  With regard to readmission, the EC should carefully balance costs and benefits for both 
sides. The EC’s responsibility does not end the moment the persons are readmitted. 
Returning substantial numbers of irregular migrants to neighbouring countries that are 
overburdened financially, administratively and socially by the challenge of either 
reintegrating their own nationals or – even more difficult – further readmitting third-country 
nationals to their countries of origin might put their often weak economic, political and 
social stability at risk.  
•  Thus, the EC should take a step further and think about supporting its neighbours in the 
process of implementation of visa and readmission agreements. Otherwise, the dominant 
focus on strong and effective control of frontiers might put the stability of neighbourhood 
regions at risk again. 
                                                      
23 Authors’ interview with Ukrainian specialist on visa policy, 25 January 2008. | 33 
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